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EASTERN EUROPE'S NORTHERN TIER AND PROPOSED CHANGES
IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE

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Sally W. Stoecker

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I. EASTERN EUROPE'S NORTHERN TIER AND PROPOSED CHANGES IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE ¹

Introduction

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact issued a "revolutionary" communique on May 29, 1987,² stating that its military doctrine would be "strictly defensive" in nature and would require only the minimal level of weapons "sufficient" for the defense--thereby abrogating past reliance on rapid and powerful offensive maneuvers and an armor-heavy force posture. This controversial declaration has sparked debate not only within the Warsaw Pact, but also among Western scholars of Soviet military affairs.

As this paper indicates, the reactions of the Warsaw Pact countries to this declaration vary. Each country's response is determined by its national interests, which in turn are influenced by historical, military, political, and economic factors. Nonetheless, it is possible to speculate that military officers of the Northern Tier (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, or GDR) may lack enthusiasm for a revised doctrine because of concerns about the defense of their homeland and their strategic importance within the Warsaw Pact. On a political level, however, these countries have issued disarmament proposals of their own, suggesting a political endorsement of Gorbachev's arms control initiatives.

These tentative conclusions are based on three factors: an examination of the East European role in the formulation of national and Warsaw Pact military doctrine; the "civil-military debate" that seems to have surfaced within the Soviet Union as a result of the Berlin communique; and a review of some of the historical and other influential issues at play in each of the Northern Tier countries.

¹This paper was written to fulfill a course requirement at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

²"Communique of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members," *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 30, 1987, p. 1.



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Soviet-Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine

Warsaw Pact doctrine, essentially formulated by Soviet military strategists, is one element of Soviet "global" strategic planning as well as a political tool to promote Warsaw Pact cohesion. Theoretically, the East European countries have their own national doctrines (governing national troops) in addition to that of the Warsaw Pact. It is generally agreed, however, that the national doctrines are largely products of the Warsaw Pact. Depending on the scenario, certain units of the national forces are earmarked to participate in a Soviet-led offensive.³ The degree of doctrinal and operational integration seems to depend largely on the strategic location of the countries. From the Soviet perspective, those countries wedged between the Soviet Union and West Germany--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR--are the most critical to a successful theater offensive. Even Poland's concept of territorial defense, for example, appears to be better integrated into Warsaw Pact plans than that of Romania or Hungary, whose national doctrines are constantly glorified as symbols of independence. A recent Hungarian press release noted the importance of its national doctrine:

An independent Hungarian military doctrine is also important because a sovereign country cannot exist without its own concept of security. A military doctrine with individual features is the symbol of independence. Just as we cannot copy other's political and economic mechanisms...we must consider Hungarian conditions in establishing the individual elements of our military doctrine.⁴

³Conversations with former Polish army colonel M. Sadykiewicz. See his *Organizing for Coalition Warfare: The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning*, The RAND Corporation, R-3559-RC, September 1988.

⁴Interview by Istvan Illes, "The Unfightability of Nuclear War," in *Magyar Hirlap*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service--East Europe (hereafter cited as FBIS-EEU), Daily Report, April 7, 1987.

Structurally, Warsaw Pact military doctrine is composed of two parts: sociopolitical and military-technical. The former, also known as "declaratory doctrine," is primarily a political document formulated by the Political Consultative Committee for external consumption--not unlike American references to "extended deterrence" or "mutual assured destruction" (policies that while convenient, say little about how the United States intends to implement them). It is at this level that the Soviets have consistently labeled their doctrine defensive.

The military-technical dimension, sometimes said to be subordinate to the declaratory, is that which governs force employment and structure--that is, how the Warsaw Pact plans to wage a future war with NATO on the Central Front, in addition to a plethora of other combat contingencies. Since the formulation, in the 1920s, of theories for deep thrusts into the enemy's rear, military writings have emphasized the primacy of the offensive in combat operations. In fact, the Warsaw Pact has resurrected several prewar offensive employment concepts for theater war over the past decade. Thus, a shift from offensive to defensive combat actions would represent a sea change in Soviet-Warsaw Pact theater conventional war plans. Some Soviet military analysts have suggested that the increased emphasis on defensive operations and exercises reflects a new concern on the part of the Warsaw Pact for a balanced approach to training in peacetime, *not* an abandonment of offensive concepts.⁵

Nonetheless, some leading military figures support the Berlin communique. According to the deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, M. A. Gareev, "Defensive operations will be the main means of repelling the enemy." On several occasions, Gareev has stated explicitly that the military-technical side of doctrine is defensively oriented.⁶

⁵Discussion of Soviet conventional operations at US III Corps Threat Conference (also known as "Lonestar/Redstar Conference"), Fort Hood, Texas, May 16-20, 1988.

⁶M. A. Gareev, Moscow Television, June 22, 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Soviet Union (hereafter cited as FBIS-SOV), Daily Report, June 23, 1987.

Signs of Debate Inside the Soviet Union

Although the Berlin communique and subsequent articles have praised the shift in doctrine to a defensive posture requiring fewer weapons, it is not at all clear that support for this plan is unanimous. In fact, the opposition may represent a genuine threat to Gorbachev's reform plans.⁷ Gorbachev and his political supporters, especially the economic reformers, have been enthusiastic about the prospect of reducing the defense budget, devoting more defense industries to civilian production, and lessening international tensions through arms control. Most military leaders, however--including the new defense minister, D. T. Yazov (presumably a Gorbachev man--have not lost sight of the military implications. Yazov makes it clear that Warsaw Pact troops must be able to resume the offensive upon attack:

It is impossible to destroy the enemy by the defense alone. Therefore, after repelling the attack, troops and naval forces must be capable of conducting a *decisive offensive*.⁸

Other Soviet military officials, as might be expected, are similarly circumspect. Gorbachev's move appears to be an affront to the military in a very basic way: The Party is encroaching on the military's turf when it toys with the operational side of military doctrine. In response, military writers such as the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev, have been quick to point out that the defensive orientation will be very "active," that strategic and conventional parity must be preserved, that unilateral reductions will not take place, and that the intensity of the NATO threat is steadily increasing.⁹

⁷For an excellent treatment of this debate, see R. Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approach to Conventional Arms Control," *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Columbia University, January 1988.

⁸D. T. Yazov, *Na strazhe sotsializma i mira*, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1987, p. 33.

⁹See, for example, F. Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War and Defending Peace and Socialism," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 12, 1987.

THE WARSAW PACT RESPONSE

General A. I. Gribkov, deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, seems to be giving lip service to Gorbachev's plans but is actually contradicting the General Secretary's wishes for a defensive force posture by insisting that the strategic defensive requires *no restructuring* of Soviet forces.¹⁰ Gribkov, like Akhromeyev and others, has also emphasized the irreducibility of the "counteroffensive," which worked so well in World War II, in repulsing the enemy.

Given his position, Gribkov invariably has a keen appreciation for the potential unpredictability of combat actions on the Central Front should the "unforeseeable" NATO-Warsaw Pact war actually be unleashed. Thus, it would seem that he would be reluctant to have his war plans circumscribed in any way. Given the uncertain nature of a future conflict, so the military theoreticians write, it may be very difficult to distinguish between offense and defense in the chaos of war.¹¹ Moreover, Warsaw Pact members are concerned about new NATO surveillance and attack systems, which promise to pose unprecedented threats to their deeply echeloned troops.¹² By the same token, it is precisely these threats to combat troops' survivability that may be forcing a reconsideration of offensive operations in Warsaw Pact doctrine. If this is the case, we would expect to see changes in force posture, defensive combat exercises, greater use of mines and barriers, and less reliance on tanks. Weapons such as barriers and mines, however, pose considerable political problems with which the Warsaw Pact may currently be grappling.¹³

¹⁰Interview with Colonel General Gribkov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, September 25, 1987, found in J. Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security*, Winter 1987, p. 122. It should be noted that Gribkov is a member of the Soviet military and therefore would be expected to uphold the positions of his comrades in Moscow.

¹¹See, for example, V. G. Reznichenko (ed.), *Taktika*, Chap. 1, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1984.

¹²See Polish sources such as Colonel Czeslaw Kieda, "Repelling Counterattacks and Commitment of the Second Echelon," *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych*, March 1987.

¹³NATO has also encountered resistance from member countries concerning proposals to plant defensive weapons on their soil. See M.

Economic concerns may also be driving the reform of doctrine. Given the chronic problems of most East European economies, reductions in defense spending are essential. Romania, for example, has already announced unilateral cuts in defense spending.¹⁴ This in turn has led Hungarian authorities to reconfigure their forces to brigade-size units. Thus, a defensive doctrine may undercut the reliance on potentially ill-prepared waves of offensively oriented troops while simultaneously saving everyone a lot of money.¹⁵

Hence, the issuance of the Berlin communique may be a response to various military, economic, and political factors at play both in Moscow and within the Warsaw Pact. Among them are the following:

- *Economic imperatives:* Reduced reliance by the Soviets on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces, whose readiness and reliability are in question given trends toward reduced defense spending to redress flagging economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- *NATO conventional defense enhancements:* Genuine fears that offensive maneuvers are not suitable for a future conflict in light of the heightened lethality of NATO's conventional weapons coming on line.
- *Propaganda ploy:* Primarily a propagandistic effort to appear less aggressive, in keeping with Gorbachev's themes of improved international relations, flexibility, and interdependence, as well as to encourage West European socialist and social democratic parties to step up their own calls for "defensive defense" in NATO.

Weiner, *Analyzing Alternative Concepts for the Defense of NATO*, The RAND Corporation, P-7032, October 1984.

¹⁴M. Manescu, speech in *Scinteia* in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Bucharest, November 7, 1987, FBIS-EEU, November 10, 1987.

¹⁵The argument that a defensive posture will save money, while intuitively sound, may be flawed. Some analysts point out that the logistical needs associated with such a posture will easily offset the reduction in offensive weapons and troops. For the purpose of this paper, however, and in the absence of any concrete evidence to the contrary, I will maintain that such a shift would entail some savings.

Poland

Poland actually preempted the Berlin communique with its announcement, three weeks earlier at the second Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) Congress, of the "Jaruzelski Plan," which also called for a defensive doctrine. Reminiscent of the "Rapacki Plan" of 1957, which proposed the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and troops in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia,¹⁶ the Jaruzelski Plan envisions the thinning out of all nuclear and conventional weapons within a 1,200-square-kilometer region of Central Europe, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Benelux countries, Denmark, and the FRG. With regard to doctrine, the plan proposes to "negotiate an entirely new disarmament concept--namely, that military doctrines be regarded as strictly defensive doctrines, ones that threaten no country."¹⁷ Both of these Polish initiatives stem in part from Polish fears of German military power and from the prospect that it could be used against them again, as it was in 1939. Hence the Poles may have more compelling reasons than do the Soviets to reduce conventional arms.

Many civilian articles referring to the plan in the Polish press are generally favorable, often referring to the money that could be saved and put to "peaceful development" purposes. Given the dire state of the Polish economy, whose debt is upwards of \$37 billion, it is not surprising that the discussion would turn to economics and to the possibility of reducing further the already small defense budget's 2.4 percent share of GNP.¹⁸ Others have stressed the contribution to *European security* that the Jaruzelski Plan could make.¹⁹

¹⁶Radio Liberty report, Polish Service, May 15, 1987, p. 14.

¹⁷See *Tribuna Ludu*, FBIS-EEU report, June 3, 1987.

¹⁸R. L. Hutchings cites percentages of GNP of defense spending for each East European country in 1979. See his updated book, *Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1987, p. 149.

¹⁹Gen. F. Siwicki, *Rzeczpospolita*, January 6, 1987, FBIS-EEU, January 13, 1988.

This support for the Jaruzelski Plan, however--while reminiscent of the Rapacki Plan--also contradicts military pronouncements about its commitment to themes of coalition warfare in the past, which have emphasized the "superiority" of Warsaw Pact conventional forces and offensive combat operations launched against NATO as a means of protecting Polish soil from the ravages of warfare so well remembered from the past.²⁰ In fact, Polish writers were the first to discuss the operational maneuver group--an offensive force employment concept for tank and motorized rifle units--which has not explicitly appeared yet in Soviet military sources.²¹ If the Polish military has indeed been a major contributor to Warsaw Pact doctrine, this radical shift to the defense might anger military professionals who have had a hand in the formulation of the offensive doctrine. One example of military opposition to reports of measures enacted to help the civilian economy, was recently broadcast on Polish television:

The economic measures must not affect factors which determine the quality of training and the state of readiness of our military forces. They must not limit the necessary modernization of basic weaponry and purchases of essential combat equipment.²²

With respect to Polish military structure, however, it is important to note that Polish forces comprise two fronts: internal and external.²³ It has been argued that less than 1 percent of the

²⁰A. R. Johnson et al., *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, Crane Russak, New York, 1982, p. 27.

²¹See, for example, Colonel A. Musial, "Dzialanie bojowe lotnictwa na korzysc operacyjnych grupa manewrowych," *Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych i Wojsk OPK*, July-August 1982.

²²Lieutenant Colonel J. Saposiek, Warsaw television, January 21, 1988, FBIS-EEU, January 22, 1988.

²³Former Polish military officer M. Sadykiewicz argues persuasively that the Polish internal front is far more crucial to a Warsaw Pact operation than the external front. For an exhaustive account of the internal front see M. Sadykiewicz, *Wartime Missions of the Polish Internal Front*, The RAND Corporation, N-2401-1-OSD, July 1986.

population makes up the external front, which encompasses those forces pegged for combat outside of Poland.²⁴ This front, it would seem, would be more likely to oppose changes in operational doctrine. By contrast, the internal front--which is composed of military and paramilitary forces whose job is to fulfill defensive missions within Poland to protect friendly troops transiting by rail and over bridges en route to combat--would probably not be greatly affected by a doctrinal shift. In fact, were a defensive doctrine truly adopted, it could result in an influx of troops from the external front to assist with the defense, requiring a somewhat stronger logistic network.

Thus, if the doctrinal shift to a defensive military posture were adopted, it would probably not have a large impact on the war preparation of the Polish *internal front*, which is completely committed to protecting its borders from external aggression. Members of the military elite, however, who are engaged in planning for and participating in a hypothetical NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, may be resistant to such a radical change in doctrine and its implications for the battlefield.

Jaruzelski's ambitious disarmament plan seems to indicate that he is outwardly (and politically) falling in step with Gorbachev's policies of promoting peace and reducing tensions. How well this sits with the military is difficult to judge, although it is important to note that Jaruzelski himself is a general. It would seem likely that, given historical concerns for the country's defense, efforts to implement a change in operational doctrine would encounter resistance.

The German Democratic Republic

The GDR occupies what would appear to be a unique position within the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the other countries, the GDR lacks a strong sense of nationalism, as it was molded into a Soviet satellite in 1949. In the absence of deeply rooted nationalism, ideology serves the role of binding together the society and promoting a large degree of Soviet-East German cooperation. According to one Western analyst, 99 percent of East German military officers belong to the Socialist party.²⁵

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ See D. R. Herspring, "The Military Factor in East German Soviet Policy," *Slavic Review*, Spring 1988, p. 99.

Soviet-German cooperation dates back to 1922 with the signing of the Rapallo Treaty, which provided increased trade and clandestine military cooperation to the Soviets to rebuild its war-torn economy in the aftermath of the Civil War. But cooperation a la Rapallo is also a reminder of betrayal by the Germans, who later invaded the "Motherland" and took 20 million lives.

These sentiments persist today. The East Germans, whose productive capacity far outshines its bloc partners, are quite willing to trade with the West. Concurrently, a strong disposition toward protection from NATO aggression is prevalent--and manifested in East German writings on its "inviolable borders" and the "separateness of the two German states."

Fervent commitment to Warsaw Pact defense is not surprising in view of the fact that the GDR borders on the Central Front and is therefore the highest military priority of the Warsaw Pact. Some 400,000 Soviet troops are stationed there, the commander in chief of whom has the authority to call a state-of-war emergency. Unlike the other national armies of the Warsaw Pact, the East German "Volksarmee" is completely subordinate to Warsaw Pact command *in peacetime*.²⁶

In light of its historical fears and strategic position, one would expect the GDR to fervently oppose any diminution of its conventional military strength as suggested by the Berlin communique. It is interesting to note that the GDR issued a peace initiative of its own calling for the establishment of a *nuclear-free* corridor and a *chemical-weapon free* zone along the inter-German border, never mentioning a reduction of conventional arms. The only context in which they appear to have discussed reducing all three is a joint East-West effort.²⁷

Financially, however, the Berlin communique should appeal to the GDR, which has shouldered the largest defense burden among Warsaw Pact members: approximately 6 percent.²⁸ East German resentment was

²⁶A. R. Johnson, op. cit.

²⁷FBIS-EEU, April 8, 1988, p. 9.

²⁸D. R. Herspring, op. cit., p. 101.

detected three years ago, when Moscow made a push for greater Warsaw Pact contribution to the maintenance of the "military-strategic balance."²⁹

There are signs that the East German Politburo does not support Moscow's new programs. Gorbachev's reform efforts have been accompanied by liberal approaches to, and even contradictions of, Marxist-Leninist ideology that seem to threaten the East Germans. One East German Politburo member, for example, in his lengthy treatise in honor of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, referred to the Red October's guarantee of work to all citizens as something capitalists certainly can't claim.³⁰ This may have been a dig at Gorbachev's economic reforms, which may spell unemployment.

In sum, the military and the party are well interwoven in the GDR. Therefore, unlike the other East European countries, overt challenges to the military by the party or vice versa are almost imperceptible. The undeniable Soviet troop presence within the country, together with the NATO threat from without, will probably propel the East Germans to seek reductions in the NATO threat as well as to establish a strong and flexible military posture which, like that of Poland, will allow it to respond to any contingency, offensive or defensive.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia differs from Poland and the GDR in many respects, as illustrated by its ethnic diversity (particularly Czech-Slovak rivalries). This does not imply that the citizens of Czechoslovakia lack a sense of nationalism. After having struggled against the Austro-Hungarian empire and successfully created an independent state in 1918 that lasted until the Germans came in in 1938, having then been taken by the Communists in 1948, and having been suppressed again in 1968, the Czechs have undoubtedly acquired a heightened nationalistic spirit and a strong aversion to foreign intruders.

²⁹Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Research Analysis Division, Background Report #143, December 9, 1985.

³⁰H. Sindermann, speech at ceremony in Berlin marking the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, FBIS-EEU, November 9, 1987.

This sense of nationalism was manifested in the "reformulation" of military doctrine that took place in the late sixties in response to the Prague Spring. Military scientists, for example, devised their own command-and-control model and spoke of "decoupling" Czechoslovak troops from coalition warfare and other measures curtailing Soviet participation.

Much of their thinking was contained the in the *Gottwald Memorandum*, issued by the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in May of 1968, which called for bilateral agreements with the FRG, nuclear- and troop-free corridors, and a military doctrine based on geopolitics, not ideology.³¹ Because the military was the chief proponent of the memorandum, the repression associated with the 1968 invasion that destroyed the memorandum also damaged the morale and performance of the army--a scar that still accompanies it.

It is against this background that we examine the Czechoslovak reaction to the Berlin communique. Like Poland and the GDR, Czechoslovakia has put forth a peace initiative named after the new General Secretary. The "Jakes Plan" seeks to establish a "zone of confidence" along the border dividing the Warsaw Pact and NATO wherein offensive weapons will be destroyed. This initiative, like those of Poland and the GDR, fits nicely with the theme of the Berlin communique promoting a defensive doctrine. As one official source described it:

We are not tying our future to a military solution of international problems, we regard the military solution of any and all controversial issues intolerable. Thus our doctrine is a defensive doctrine, by its contents and stipulations. Under no circumstances will we ever initiate military actions.³²

³¹A. R. Johnson, op. cit., p. 118.

³²Editorial, "Doctrine of Peace and Political Realism," *Rude Pravo*, June 6, 1987, FBIS-EEU, June 18, 1987.

Czechoslovak Defense Minister General Vaclavik viewed the disclosure of Warsaw Pact doctrine to the general public of "exceptional importance," as it refuted "myths about the aggressive character of the Warsaw Pact."³³ Later in the interview, however, Vaclavik indicated that these changes must not detract from a high level of combat readiness, which he admitted is lacking. In a candid discussion of officer recruitment problems, the minister noted that, although there are enough applicants to secondary military schools,

I cannot say the same about applications to advanced military academies. A considerable number of applicants cannot be accepted because they do not fulfill the requirements. Interest in humanitarian directions exceeds many times over the interest in technical and officer-training military academies.... Some of these boys show dislike of committing themselves to political and social activity. They accept uncritically everything that comes from the West.³⁴

This rather gloomy picture of the Czechoslovak national troops' readiness and questionable ability to command troops leaves the impression that perhaps both military and political forces in Czechoslovakia would support the Berlin communique. For the political leaders, endorsement of the plan would illustrate its willingness to "play along." If military leaders were also to endorse it, some of the problems currently associated with the military could be assuaged, for example, if fewer troops of lesser quality were required for defense purposes. The economic ramifications could also be favorable; however, it appears that the Czechoslovak media have devoted less space to the issue of defense spending, which totals about 2.8 percent of the country's GNP.³⁵

³³Interview with Defense Minister M. Vaclavik, Prague Television Service, July 6, 1987, FBIS-EEU, July 10, 1987.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Czechoslovakia is the second highest contributor to Warsaw Pact defense after the GDR. See R. L. Hutchings, op. cit., p. 149.

Conclusions

It is impossible to make any sweeping generalizations about civil-military responses to the Berlin communique in the Northern Tier countries of Eastern Europe. However, it is possible to speculate on potential reactions by these countries on the basis of their security concerns and allegiance to the Soviet Union.

One would expect most of the military professionals to oppose any outside effort to tamper with their war plans and restrict their options for waging war in any way. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which historically have been subject to repeated invasions, as well as the GDR, which *borders* on the Central Front, would all have valid reasons to steer clear of a revised doctrine unless they believe that, in the face of potential NATO conventional defense enhancements, the offense is truly becoming obsolete.

Concerns about funding an offensive force posture may very well lie at the base of the communique's call for a less ponderous arsenal, as demonstrated by Hungary's ground force reorganization and Romania's unilateral reduction of its defense budget. But among the Northern Tier countries, this argument is less compelling in light of their strategic importance to Moscow and strong commitments to the protection of their homeland's borders.

Although Poland's economy is in dire need of reform, its military mission of defending and transporting primarily Soviet troops from the Western military districts to the Central Front, coupled with its stalwart defense of the internal front, suggests little enthusiasm for doctrinal change. In fact, a defensive strategy may prove more demanding for Polish forces, as logistic support needs increase.

Finally, the fact that all three countries issued disarmament initiatives of their own indicates a compulsion or necessity to follow Gorbachev's lead politically in this arena--even for Jaruzelski, whose "plan" was announced before the Berlin meeting. It is interesting to note the absence of a "Honecker Plan." Perhaps Honecker's disapproval of the communique or of the GDR's defense burden in general dissuaded him from becoming personally identified with a disarmament plan.

In any event, it appears that all three proposals were of propagandistic nature, illustrating Warsaw Pact cohesion at a time of domestic upheaval in the USSR. This seems to indicate that, at least politically, the Northern Tier countries are in step with Gorbachev. Some members of the military, however, appear to be marching to a different cadence.